Greg Detre
Wednesday, 20 March, 2002
Reading � Grayling, empiricists in Grayling
Further
difficulties: perceptions and qualities
Difficulties
about impressions and ideas
empiricism = the source and test of contingent knowledge is experience
(e.g. natural science � observation and experiment constitute both the source of knowledge and the means of legitimising it)
formal deductive systems are not bodies of knowledge, but are merely �analytic�
analytic = true just in virtue of the definitions of the terms in which they are expressed, i.e. less obvious tautologies
�what is being predicated of the subject is already implicit in the subject�
two connected kinds of empiricism:
experience is said to be the source of concepts
experience is said to be the guarantee of their legitimacy
experience = chiefly means sensory experience (i.e. the five senses), aided when necessary by such instruments as telescopes + microscopes
but it also includes introspective awareness of the contents and operations of the experiencer�s own mind
rationalism = only the exercise of reason, or innate endowment, can furnish us with knowledge
(e.g. the formal deductive system, like geometry or logic � excogitation from first principles, self-evident truths or definitions)
experience can only offer more or less probable belief about how things happen to be in our part of the universe at this point in its history
the only proper objects for knowledge are changeless truths (rather than the contingent matters of empirical enquiry)
doctrine of innate ideas = we are born with a significant quantum of knowledge, especially about the fundamentals of theology, morality and logic
necessary in order to explain how we have access to ultimate truths (e.g. goodness, reason and God) without having learnt them by experience
realism (of the physical world) = the world exists independently of experience
important issues that arise, e.g.:
what account do rationalists give of perception?
what do empiricists say about a priori knowledge?
concepts have content � or: the expressions of language have meaning � only if experience in one or another way confers it upon them
to stray beyond what experience legitimises is, empiricists claim, to involve oneself in either vacuity or nonsense
how then can empiricists accept realism, if they dismiss claims about what transcends experience?
Locke, Berkeley and Hume are empiricists insofar as they premise the fundamental role of experience
1632-1704
Essay concerning human understanding � intended to address questions about the nature and extent of human knowledge
�to examine our Abilities, and see what Objects our Understandings are, or are not fitted to deal with�
detailed project of inquiry into �the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane knowledge, together with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion and Assent�
fourth book: we have knowledge when we are justifiably certain of what we claim to know
most of what we know is not knowledge properly so called but judgement, belief, opinion or faith � but �the Candle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our Purposes�
described himself as an �Underlabourer�, trying to clear away outdated, jargon-laden abstractions of scholastic and rationalist theories
in order to support the claim that knowledge comes primarily from experience, Locke needs to specify the nature of experience, show what we can know by experience, and with what degree of assurance
first book: attacking the claim that we innately know principles, e.g.
�what is, is�
�nothing contradicts itself�
�a whole is greater than its parts�
the argument for them is universal agreement
Locke responded that not everyone agrees (e.g. children + some adults), and it wouldn't be proof even if they did
he does not reject the claims that:
we are born with the capacity to recognise these principles
they are in some sense self-evidently true to anyone capable of understanding them
but they don't entail innatism
if any principles were innate, then their constituent ideas would have to be too
but even if �it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be� was an innate principle, no one would say that its constituent ideas �impossibility� and �identity� are innate too
he also objected to innatism because it supported the divine right of kings
if the mind literally began as a blank slate, it would be incapable of receiving and processing (storing, comparing, contrasting, reasoning about) the inputs of experience
two forms of innatism:
strong form: we are born with knowledge (knowing a number of propositions), e.g. Plato
weaker form: we are born with capacities for acquiring knowledge (compatible with Locke�s view that all knowledge is ultimately based on experience)
Russell
on a priori knowledge: if we do not know something independently of
experience, we cannot know anything at all
Locke
didn't distinguish between independence
and antecedence of knowledge in
relation to experience???
all concepts, are dependent upon because they ultimately derive from experience (are entirely a posteriori)
knowledge = the grasp of relations between the concepts
Leibniz argued that we would not be able to grasp the principle of identity if it wasn't logically prior to any of its instances
Locke distinguished between logical and psychological (whether we have to know it before we know its instances) priority
�how do we come by our ideas?� is a crucial question for Locke
final chapter � everything that comes within the compass of human knowledge comes under three heads:
1. physics � everything that exists
the inquiry into the �Nature of Things� (�Matter, and Body, but Sprits also�)
2. practics � ethics
the inquiry into conduct which leads to what is good and useful in the promotion of happiness
3. semiotics � the study of the �signs� which �the Minds makes use for the understanding of Things, or conveying its Knowledge to others�
the ��doctrine of signs� (the two central books of the Essay)
two kinds of signs (�the great Instruments of Knowledge�) � very closely connected:
ideas � need to be clear about their nature + origins
words � used to communicate them
ideas
= �whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ�d about in thinking�
= �whatsoever the Mind perceives in itself or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding�
they come from experience (two forms):
1. sensation � observation of external sensible objects
caused by the action of external objects on our sense organs, which are stimulated to �convey into the Mind� perceptions of the sensible qualiteis of the things which caused the sensation (e.g. shape, texture, colour and scent)
2. reflection � internal observation of the operations of one�s own mind
introspective awareness of the activities of the mind as it busies itself with the ideas it contains (comparising, remembering, believing etc.)
distinguishes between:
simple ideas = the atoms of experience, building-blocks, passively received by the mind in sensation (or reflection)
e.g. colours, tastes
two consistent but not equivalent definitions:
experiential criterion: �one uniform Appearance, or Conception, in the Mind�, and cannot be distinguished into component ideas
logical/semantic criterion: those whose names are not capable of being defined
complex ideas = composed of combined simple ideas
�it is not in the Power of the most exalted Wit, or enlarged Understanding, by any quickness of variety of Thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in the way before mentioned�
classified complex ideas under three heads (first edition of the Essay):
1. substance = ideas of things
(ambiguous between concrete particulars (i.e. individual substances) and abstractions etc.)
2. modes = ideas of their properties
3. relations = ideas of their relations with each other
psychological account (fourth edition of the Essay) � given in terms of the mind�s ability to:
combine � produces complexity
compare � produces relation
abstract � produces general ideas (e.g. man, dog, whiteness)
the function of ideas is to serve as signs
the function of a sign is to stand for/represent something other than itself
veil of perception doctrine = sensory ideas are intermediaries between the mind and whatever the mind is related to in experience
e.g. a table viewed from different perspectives/circumstances etc. has different sizes/shapes etc., but we still consider it to be the same thing
our perception of the table is mediated by the ideas it produces in our minds(???)
what then is the relation between ideas and the things to which we thus mediately refer them?
Locke�s corpuscularian theory � causal view:
there are powers in objects to produce ideas in our minds
�the Power to produce any Idea in our Mind, I call Quality of the Subject wherein the power is�
qualities:
1. primary qualities � in objects themselves, �utterly inseparable from the Body in what estate soever it be� :
a. extension
b. shape
c. motion or rest
d. number
e. solidity
2. secondary qualities � �are nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce the various sensations in us by their primary Qualities�
a. colour
b. sound
c. taste
d. smell
e. texture
3. powers by whose means things act on one another, e.g. the power in fire to melt wax
�Ideas of primary qualities are resemblances; of secondary, not. From whence I think it easy to draw this observation,- that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves�
indirect representative realist theory of perception: �For, since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas�
imprecision of the term �idea�, used in different senses:
1. states of mind such as feelings and sensations
2. acts of thinking such as considering and paying attention
3. images or pictures in the mind�s eye
4. concepts � sometimes the act of conceiving and sometimes the concept itself
5. intermediaries between minds and objects
it may help sometimes to divide his use of the term according to whether he means simple or complex ideas
not all ideas represent the same way:
he points to sensory ideas of primary qualities resembling their causes, while those of secondary qualities do not
ideas as images represent other ideas, rather than qualities or things
ideas as general concepts do not represent in the same way as ideas of particular substances (i.e. categories vs individual objects)
this confusion could arise from trying to give both:
an account of mind and its operations
and an empiricist account of the relation of knowledge and its objects in a corpuscularian world
(??? pg 495)
two problems � restricting attention to considerations about sensory and introspective awareness:
may not give an adequate basis for a general theory of mind and knowledge
implications for understanding a priori knowledge and mind�s contribution to experience
(??? pg 495)
empiricism requires something substantial in perception antecedent to reasonings + theories, so the account of perception is crucial
standard view:
Locke�s account of perception is representational
sensory ideas are pictures of their originals in the world, conveying information about them to the mind by serving as their intermediaries
given that secondary qualities do not resemble their cause, these pictures must be drawn partly by the receiving mind � invites scepticism
some commentators argue that sometimes �idea� is used to mean � a thought of an object� and sometimes �an object of thought� and never as an intermediary between them
but Grayling does not think this suggestion is supported by the Essay itself
�How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?�
Locke argues that since the mind cannot originate simple ideas itself, they �must necessarily be the product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural way�
in order to defend Locke and his representational theory, you have to show that there are ways in which representations can be treated as reliable even though we cannot break out of the circle of ideas in which the theory places us
e.g. assume realism is true, but this assumption needs defending
primary-secondary qualities distinction:
because PQs are �in the things themselves� we are in closest touch with things when we perceive, describe and measure their primary qualities
the distinction presupposes indirect + representative perception (= sensory ideas convey information about something other than themselves, but only partly as those things intrinsically are)
describes secondary but not primary qualities as �powers�
secondary qualities = powers in the objects to produce in us ideas of colour, taste etc.
so when we are not looking at the red flag, the flag is not red, although it has the power to make us see red if we care to look
primary qualities are properties of objects which are there whether we perceive them or not
but clearly there is some power in the object responsible for causing us to have ideas of primary qualities
the best suggestion is that primary qualities are in some sense the grounds of those powers
then: perceptions of (e.g.) shape are: resemblances of the grounds of a power to produce in us an idea of a certain shape
Grayling thinks the problem is with
the notion of �powers�
Berkeley:
argued that both kinds of qualities are importantly alike in being sensible (objects of sensory awareness)
so all the sceptical arguments about secondary qualities apply to primary properties too
names are general � they stand for class/kinds of things (apart from proper names), and knowledge is largely about kinds
words have meaning by denoting ideas, which originate in experience, so the meaning of words + the content of concepts is empirically derived/controlled
words = sounds or marks arbitrarily chosen to be the signs of ideas to record + communicate thoughts (which are private)
Locke signals two assumptions:
words stand for the same ideas in different men
we suppose �Words to stand also for the reality of Things�
he considers this to be our mistake, since words stand only for the ideas we have in our own minds, which in turn mediate reference to things
how do words come to be general in signification?
they need to be because if every individual thing had its own name, language would be useless
way of abstraction = �Words become general, by being made the signs of general Ideas: and Ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other Ideas, that may determine them tothis or that particular Existence�
rather than by noting what is common to them
thus they �belong not to the real
existence of things; but are the
Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only Signs, whether Words,
or Ideas�
problems:
how can we be sure that words signify the same ideas in different people�s minds? how does our usage of words conform with other people�s?
Locke urges people to �apply their Words, as near as may be, to such Ideas as common use has annexed them�
implicitly assumes that meaning is related to or constrained by �common use�
anticipates: theory that meanings of expressions in natural languages are functions of the uses speakers make of them
but there is no non-circular way of saying what common use is, so disputes about the signification of words always remain possible
plus, words� meaning changes, or new words are coined
Locke implausibly assumes that thought is independent from (and precedes) language + the desire to communicate
it could be that what it is to have the concept consists in having the relevant linguistic competence
Locke confuses the:
sense of a term (public/shared feature)
psychological assocations for an individual speaker
meaning cannot be a function of the contingently different private psychologies of speakers (semantic individualism) but must be a public property of our signs
much better to think of language as a social construct, shared among speakers on the basis of a common repository of theories + beliefs
Berkeley argued that general terms stand for a number of particular things/uses, rather than denoting an indeterminate �general idea� which is an amalgam of the things it signifies
excessive reliance on visual imagery as the model for ideas
because our minds have no other object than their ideas, knowledge can be �nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas�
intuitive knowledge = when the (dis)agreement of two ideas is immediately obvious
demonstrative knowledge = when reasoning is required to make the (dis)agreement plain (requiring steps of inference)
whatever falls short of intuition or demonstration is not, strictly speaking, knowledge � however:
sensitive knowledge = �about the particular existence of finite Beings without us; which going beyond bare probability and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge�
he dismisses scepticism � we are �invincibly conscious� of the effects on us of the external world, and the supposition that it might all be a dream is either pointless or manifestly improbable
�so that, I think, we may add to the two former sorts of Knowledge, this also, of the existence of particular external Objects, by that perception and Consciousness we have of the actual entrance of Ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of Knowledge, viz. Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive: in each of which, there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty�
limitations of our knowledge: lack of ideas, lack of discoverable connections between them, failure on our part to properly trace and examine them
Grayling sees Locke�s robust common sense view as anticipating Hume/Kant/Wittgenstein etc.:
there are bare facts with respect to which we have no option about what to believe� and how to think
Kant: the �no option� clause � by examining in detail the structure and basis of the scheme of concepts we employ
two key points support Locke�s refusal to address scepticism:
attack on innate ideas � all our knowledge can come from experience (book I does not say that it in fact does, only that it can)
(??? pg 503)
simple ideas of sense � arise in ways uncontrolled by our wills as if from external sources, provides the notion of the �empirically given� intended as a foundation for the rest of our congitive structure
but critics reply that it is precisely here, ov er the origin, nature and security of simple ideas of sense, and the constructions we are entitled to place on them, that sceptical problems arise
�substance� is one of the three types (with modes + relations) of complex ideas
intuitively: a substance is an individual self-subsisting thing
Locke wanted to defend the common sense idea that the world contains a plurality of such things (rather than the Cartesian plenum)
how do you specify the nature of an individual?
Locke distinguished between:
real essence = �the real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their disvoerable Qualities depend�
nominal essence = the collections of properties by which we sort things into kinds for our own theoretical and practical convenience, and which we donote by general terms
essences relate to kinds of thing
real and nominal essences coincide in simple ideas, and in the complex ideas of modes + relations � but never in the complex ideas of substance
difficulties:
Locke is worried that some of our ideas are manufactured, while some ideas should be produced by external (individual) things impinging upon our minds
internally unstable combination of realism + empiricism:
realism asserts the independence of the objects of experience from experience of them
empiricism asserts the fundamental dependence upon experience of anything we can say or think about its objects
difficult to bring to together:
the Cartesian notion of underlying substance-as-stuff
and a separate notion of individual essence
�substance� seems necessary to explain: identity, individuality and being
but the concept of substance is not empirically well-grounded (hence his successors� differences)
if there are no individual essences, what makes a person the same individual over time, despite various changes?
religious orthodoxy � person consists of:
material
body
immaterial immortal soul � underpins identity over time, carries personhood
remains �essentially� the same from the time of its creation onwards despite �accidental� changes
Locke:
agrees that a �human being� (physical thing) is distinct from �person� � we are born human beings but become persons
the concept of a person is a forensic one
forensic = �Of, pertaining to, or used in a court of
law, now spec. in relation to the detection of crime� (NSOED)
i.e. an intelligent, rational being responsible in morality + law for what he does, and correspondingly aware of and rationally concerned for himself as himself
psychological basis for identity: the consciousness a person has of being himself, and of being the same self now as at earlier times, in which identity consists
identity of simple physical identities = spatio-temporal continuity
identity of living things = �the same Organisation of Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one Common Life�
since many different atoms come and go, through growth and change
different for a person:
a person as a thinking, rational being could occupy different bodies at different times while still being the same person (i.e. with the same consciousness of self as a persisitng unity of memories + projects)
and a single body could have a plurality of such consciousnesses associated with it
\ a person is not identical with a body
personal identity = consciousness of self
(sketchy compound of self-awareness, memory and interest in the future)
needs to unite/constitute at a time and across time
Locke�s different accounts of it arise out of two interests (moral as opposed to ontological):
a view of the self on the one hand as a thing
on the other hand as apurely forensic item
early objections:
Butler: �consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity�
if a person forgets, then he would no longer be identical with his earlier self � seems paradoxical
implies the general is not the same person as the boy etc.
some commentators think that:
because of Locke�s insistence on the forensic character of personhood, he meant to nominate the moral link of responsibility rather than the cognitive link of memory as fundamental identity
but isn't the moral link itself dependent on the cognitive link???
thus a person P is identical with an earlier self for whose actions, debts and the rest P accepts responsibility
what about parents who accept responsibility for their children�s actions?
but then why would a criminal ever claim to be personally identical with someone morally responsible for a crime???
a forensic link does not dependt on a memory link � you could take responsibility for actions you don't remember
modern thought experiments further undermine Locke�s position
Grayling considers e.g. a child who suffers total amnesia, but still has major claims on its parents to be treated in most relvant respects as the same person as before
isn't that a bad example, because really the claims a child has on its parents are unconditional and biological, rather than personal, anyway???
Hume: self (empirical grounds) = merely a contingent bundle from fleetingly occurrent impressions
Grayling notes one aspect of Locke�s influence:
he accepted from Descartes and trasnmitted to the empiricist tradition the assumption that the right place to start an inquiry into the nature and extnet of knowledge is the private contents of individual consciousness
the empiricist twist places reliance on data of sense, whereas Descartes prioritised self-evidence principles/innate ideas
start from private data of sense + reflection, then work outwards to the external world � problems:
invites scepticism
inconsistent with realism
Locke�s successors also followed him in assuming that a good beginning to solving the problem of knowledge is correctly identifying its source
they were much more consistent in their application of experience as the authoritative source
1685-1753
predecessors: qualities inhere in matter and cause ideas in us which represent or resemble those qualities
matter = the corporeal substratum of the qualities of things
philosophical aims:
the root of scepticism:
Berkeley wondered how we (as empiricists) can tolerate the concept of matter, when it�s (by definition) empirically undetectable, as the hidden basis/support of the perceptible qualities of things
�the supposition that things are distinct from Ideas takes away all real Truth, and consequently brings in a Universal Scepticism, since all our knowledge is confined barely to our own Ideas� (Commentaries)
the opening of a gap between experience and the world, by �supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense, the one intelligible, or in the mind, the other real and without the mind�
�for so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and
that their knowledge was only so far for the real as it was conformable to real
things, it follows, they could not be certain they had any real knowledge
at all. For how can it be known, that the things which are perceived, are conformable
to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?�
hoped also to eradicate �causes of error and difficulty in the sciences�
Berkeley denies the existence of matter, but not of the external world + its physical objects
�in the mind� is better understood as �with reference to mind� or �with reference to thought or experience�
whole argument summarised in the first six paragraphs of the Principles
Berkeley closes the gap between experience/world by asserting that ideas + things are the same
begins reminiscent of Locke:
the �objects of human knowledge� are �either ideas actually imprinted on tehsense, or such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways�
ideas of sense are �observed to accompany each other� � �collections� of them �come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed one thing�
besides these ideas, a �perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself�
Berkeley�s argument:
premises:
1. our thoughts, passions, and ideas of imagination do not �exist without the mind�
2. �the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended/combined (i.e. whatever objects they compse) cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them�
therefore:
the gap between ideas + things closes
for if:
things = collections of qualities
qualities = sensible ideas
sensible ideas exist only in mind
then what it is for a thing to exist is for it to be perceived � �esse est percipi�
i.e. sensible objects can have no perception-independent (�absolute�) existence
doctrine of �abstract ideas� = that things can exist apart from perception of them
abstraction is a falsifying move
abstraction
= treating separately things which can only be separated in thought but not in reality, e.g. the colour + extension of a surface
= noting/attending only to a feature common to many different things, not the particular instantiations, e.g. redness apart from any red particular red object
we abstract existence from perception, and thus come to hold that things can exist unperceived (the �common opinion�)
to say that things exist is to say that they are perceived, and therefore �so long as they are not perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else susbist in the mind of some eternal spirit�, i.e. God
therefore �there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives�
Berkeley�s New Principle = the universe consists of minds and their ideas (i.e. whatever is perceived) � the only substance (the ultimately reality/nature of the universe) is mind
the New Principle refutes scepticism by rejecting matter, and the gap disappears between perception and a material world hidden behind a veil of ideas
distinction between idea + notion:
idea = �any immediate object of sense or understanding�
ideas are always sensory (either the content of states of sensory awareness, or the copies of these in memory/imagination)
two crucial features of ideas:
1. mind-dependent
2. inert � no necessary connections between ideas � they are individual entities �with no power or agency included in them� to alter each other
spirit/mind is causally responsible for their �continual succession�
notion = �such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind�
notions are concepts principally of self, mind and God
they do not originate in sense experience, but in immediate intuition (re one�s own mind) or �reflexion and reasoning� (re God)
perception = any way of having ideas + notions before the mind, in sensing, conceiving, imagining, remembering, reasoning etc. (???)
since my mind is causally responsible for very few ideas, there must be �some other spirit that produces them�
to infer about that spirit, you have to look at the ideas + changes it produces
�the ideas of sense are more strong, lively and distinct than those of imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series� (Principles) (cf Hume)
these �set rules or methods� are the �Laws of Nature� � we learn them by experience, �that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things�
thus, God, the �Author of Nature� is the ultimate source of ideas + their connections
although everything that exists is mind-dependent, it has an objective source/structure in the eternal ubiquitous and lawlike perceiving of an infinite mind
insofar as the world exists independently of the thought + experience of finite minds, Berkeley is a realist
i.e. claiming to defend common sense (that grass is green whether or not we are looking at it etc.)
the world is just as we perceive it to be even when we [the finite minds] are not perceiving it
whereas on the Lockean view, the world is colourless, odourless and silent until perceived, in whom it produces colours etc.
grass has powers to make us see green, but is not itself green
Berkeley contends that his metaphysical description is just an alternative to our ordinary way of talking about reality
causality:
Locke: the empirical basis for our concept of causality comes from our own felt powers as agents, i.e. we project our causal efficacy onto the world to explain chains of events
Berkeley: this projecting is empirically ungrounded
although its convenient to attribute causal agency to things, things/ideas are inert, and apparent causal connections ultimately derive from God�s agency
vital assumption:
begin inquiry among the private data of individual consciousness, i.e. among the ideas constituting an individual�s experience
although we should keep sight of the subjective perspective, since each subject of experience is in the solipsistic + finitary predicament, even if we argue that assumptions about shared language and therefore a shared world, on which we have a participant rather than merely passive perspective, provide material for a better account
objection:
Berkeley makes an elementary error identifying sensible qualities and sensory ideas
i.e. the difference between �the table is brown� and �the table looks brown to me�
- they have different truth conditions
but this begs the question by assuming that:
the qualities an object possesses are independent of claims about how they can be known to possess them
i.e. that there are observation-independent facts about the qualities of objects which can be stated without any reference to experience of them
which is what Berkeley is denying has sense when when he says that any characterisation of a sensible quality has to make essential reference to how it appears to some actual/possible perceiver
e.g. how do you explain redness/smoothness etc. independently of how they appear?
i.e. the objection fails by premising a seems-is distinction, which is exactly what Berkeley rejects because it leads straight to scepticism
Berkeley distinguishes between phenomenal and phenomenological levels:
phenomenal = the things we encounter in ordinary experience (i.e. books + trees)
phenomenological = facts about sensory experience considered strictly from the viewpoint of the experiencer�s apprehension of sensible qualities (i.e. colours + textures)
phenomenal objects consist wholly of phenomenological objects
�in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound: and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience�
this is not mediate perception, but of experience-based inference (�suggestion�)
like when you say that a poker is hot, you don't see the heat, you infer on the basis of experience that whne something looks like that it will feel a certain way if you touch it
Grayling thinks that if you defer discussion of God, and allow his Cartesian starting-point, Berkeley�s views are resilient
important argument for materialism: the concept of matter explains much in science (�appeal to the best/simplest explanation�)
Berkeley replies that science�s explanatory power and pracitcal utility neither entail the truth of, nor depend upon, the materialist hypothesis, since these can be explained at least as well in instrumental terms
instrumentalism = scientific theories are instruments or tools, to be assessed on usefulness rather than truth/falsity
Occam�s razor = do not postulate the existence of more than is absolutely necessary for adequate explanation
science is a convenient sublunary summary of what at the metaphysical level of explanation would be described in terms of the activity of infinite spirit
key points about matter for Berkeley:
it�s non-mental, so cannot be the substrate of qualities, because qualities are ideas, and ideas can only exist in a thinking substrate (i.e. minds)
it�s causally inert, and so cannot produce change/motion/ideas
materialists argue that primary qualities resemble non-mental reality
but Berkeley responds that since primary qualities are ideas, and �nothing can be like na idea but an idea� (Principles), so �neither they nor their archetypes can be in an unperceiving substance�
also, the primary/secondary quality distinction rests on a specious abstraction of one from the other
however, you can reject matter without rejecting the primary/secondary distinction � Berkeley admits this, and notes that (unlike secondary) primary qualities are:
available to more than one sense at a time
measurable
etc.
but importantly, they are on a par in both being sensible and so mind-dependent
is Berkeley�s account of minds vs ideas confused + inconsistent?:
1. Distinction Principle = minds and ideas are distinct from one another
2. Inherence Principle = ideas exist only in the mind
i.e. esse est percipi
3. Identity Principle = ideas are not distinct from perceivings of them
follows from the attack on abstraction, i.e. that we cannot abstract ideas from perception of them
most critics want to drop the Distinction Principle because it seems to commit him to an act-object analysis of perception
act-object analysis = perceiving as an act of mind directed upon an object (which is independent of the act), e.g. the beam of toch shining on a tree
this seems to demand the independence of the objects of perception (ideas), which cannot be independent of mind
but the distinction between minds (active, substantial) + ideas (inert + dependent) is crucial to Berkeley
Berkeley had rejected the notion that minds are just bundles of ideas, because �a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour � therefore I am one individual principle, distinct from � all sensible things and inert ideas�
whereas the Identity Principle commits him to an adverbial analysis
adverbial analysis = perception as a modification of the mind, e.g. to see a cat is to �see catly�, the mind in a catly-perceiving state
the expressions �Identity� and �Inherence� are misleading, because:
1. the existence of an idea is dependent upon its being actually (i.e. by a finite mind) perceived
dependence = here is that in which an embryo is dependent on a womb � it exists in it, and cannot exist without it, but is nevertheless distinct from it (Plato)
inherence = an adverbial notion (e.g. the relation of a wave to the sea � the wave is a �mode� of the sea)
�there can be no substratum of � qualities but spirit, in which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it�
2. it�s a mistake to view Berkeley�s anti-abstractionist view as amounting to an assertion of the identity of ideas with perception of them
anti-abstractionist view = any account of ideas cannot be abstracted from an account of perception
one cannot �conceive apart� any �sensible thing or object distinct from the perception of it� � but that doesn't mean that they�re numerically the same thing
e.g. the internal relation between bread and the process by which it is baked
the mind-idea relation is the biggest threat to Berkeley�s theory�s internal coherence
major foundation � that there is an infinite mind perceiving/conceiving/causing everything always (i.e. God)
since only mind/ideas exist, and finite minds could not perceive all the ideas that constitute the universe, there must be mental activity elsewhere � an infinite mind which perceives everything always and thereby keeps it in being
because imagined ideas are �not
altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, permanent, as those perceived by my
senses, which latter are called real things� and �from the variety, order and
manner of these, I conclude the Author of them to be wise, powerful and good
beyond comprehension�
the second stage, about the nature of the external mind (God), which Grayling terms the �teleological argument�, is very inadequate
design, purpose and beauty in the universe do not entail that it was designed by a single, infinite or good mind
to survive, Berkeley needs some other way of making out the idea that what exists stands in an internal relationt othoguht ro experience of it (??? pg 522)
other points about Berkeley worth considering:
his concept of conceivability
his finitary realism
whether his views are �idealist�
veiw of time
metaphysical implications of his arguments considered independently of their theistic basis
Hume is more austere and rigorous an empiricist than Locke and even than Berkeley
1711-1776
Hume focused on a theory of human nature, which he thought central, especially for his foundation of morals
if there is a basis of morality, it must be independent from the will of a deity:
after all, answering the question �why ought I do to so-and-so?�, by saying that God requires it is not a logically adequate reason
moreover, good reasons for acting a certain way should be binding on a deity too
concerned by the �general foundation of Morals�
in Hume�s view, morality is founded �entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species�
hence the need for a �science of human nature� � three heads:
logic = to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas
morals and criticism = taste and sentiments
politics = considers men as united in society, and dependent on each other
nothing we say or think is legitimate unless it can be traced to its origin in experience
Hume hoped his �principle of the association of ideas� would serve as a basis (like Newton�s theory of gravity) for a sicence of human nature, by giving explanations of experience, belief, the nature of knowledge, and the place and limits of reason
Locke:
attempted a theory of knowledge to go with corpouscularian science
depended on a RTP which seemed to separate ideas from their independent/external causes
causal relations operate between physical things
Berkeley:
denied the existence of material substance
the universe consists of minds and their ideas alone
only minds are capable of causal agency, which is upheld by God
Hume:
there is as little reason to assert the existence of substantial minds (individual mental beings persisting through time � including God) as there is to assert the existence of matter
the common notion of causation as a necessary connection between distinct entities is a myth
according to Thomas Reid (1710-96) (founder of the �Common Sense Philosophy� school) on Hume:
on the basis of experience, all we can say is that there are briefly lived perceptions, with neither cause nor object in an outer world, nor persisting subject to which they belong nor any kind of necessary bond between them
he considered Hume to be a reductio ad absurdium, demonstrating the falsity of the theory of ideas
the theory of ideas = assumes that what is perceived (the idea) exists only as an object of perception, and is distinct from whatever, if anything, is postulated as its independent cause
Reid argued: we should start instead by just accepting that there are experiencing subjects, that they are directly acquainted with things in the world,and that these things exist independently of our perceiving them
Grayling says that Reid failed to realise that the three empiricists were trying to examine and support the credentials of this common-sense view
Hume�s intention was the opposite of the radical scepticism that Reid accuses him of, e.g. �In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new and the only one upon which they can stand with any security�
however, he does also claim that his arguments show that �the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself and leave snot the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life�
he argues that human nature is so constituted that we cannot help but believe in fundamental matters like causality, inductive reasoning, the existence of self and the external world � but we cannot rationalistically give proofs of them
two kinds of perceptions:
impressions = more forceful and lively when they appear in consciousness
ideas = �the faint images of these� in thinking and reasoning
both are separated into:
simple = building-blocks of complex ones
every simple impression has a corresponding simple idea from which it is derived, but there can be complex ideas built (by the imagination) out of simple perceptiosn in ways that do not correspond to any one of them
two kinds of impressions:
sense = �arise in the soul originally, from unknown causes�, i.e. we cannot make assumptions about the external world yet, so these are just �givens�
reflexion = when we remember a sense idea of an impression of (e.g.) heat, cold, pleasure or pain, we get a new impression (of reflexion) of desire, aversion, hope or fear
two kinds of ideas:
memory = more lively and strong, retain the form in which they originated
imagination = can be rearranged at will
problems:
Hume�s model of the mind is very imagistic
ideas are mainly copies of sense impressions, i.e. mental pictures
if ideas are components of thoughts, then are thoughts images too? surely not
some thoughts, especially propositional ones, involve irreducible, non-imageable logical/structural features
ideas sometimes seem to have richer content than impressions though
impressions are atomic, i.e. independent + self-standing with no logical connections between them
yet they give rise to simple ideas which combine into complex ideas in a regular orderly way � there must be �some bond of union among them, some associating quality by which one idea naturally introduces another�
this must be a �gentle force�, otherwise we wouldn't be free to recombine the simple ideas in imagination
principle of association = three relations explain how ideas associate:
resemblance
contiguity in place and time
cause and effect
these are �the only tie of all our thoughts, they are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in great measure, depend on them�
also explains the nature of belief:
believing something = entertaining the idea of it with a special strength + liveliness arising from its association with a present impressio
�when any impression becomes present to us, it not
only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise
communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity� (???)
causation is the chief ground of all �knowledge and probability� because it is the only relation that �can be traced byeond our senses and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel�
needs to explain how ideas (distinct individual entities in consciousness) can ever be general (stand for a multiplicity of things)
custom licenses the use of general terms to denote indifferently any one of the applicable individuals (based on resemblances tewen them)
(thus, not everything can be explained purely by the principle of association)
this account is necessary, because a purely associationist theory would have difficulties explaining how a general concept could apply to every instance there has been or ever could be
thus, association is a �gentle force� uniting logically independent perceptions as a result of experience-formed habits
this gentle force can make the links feel like iron necessity though, e.g. causality
also, the analogy with gravity is misleading because associated perceptions act upon the mind, rather than each other
unexplained areas:
what counts as resembling? why do some resembling perceptions come to be associated and others not? and why do minds usually see the same resemblances as salient?
implicit theory of �propensities�, or �dispositions to form dispositions�
disposition = readiness/aptness to behave/perform in certain ways in certain conditions
it is suggested that Hume is saying that the mind has propensities to develop conceptual habits in the course of experience (Grayling notes how Kantian this sounds), especially the linking of contiguous + resembling perceptions � part of this is a propensity to impute the link to something in the world (to project it on to the objects themselves)
but he stresses experience (�the experimental method of reasoning) over the structural propensities of mind
in order to avoid innatism, he has to insist:
that there is something natural/automatic/pre-reflective about our believing/judging as we do in the relevant respects (why??? pg 531)
and that nothing thus believed/judged would figure at all unless prompted by experience
fixes attention on what can be judgieid by reference to originating impressions
possibly though, the �permanent, irresistible and universal� principles could be formed by experience, not inherited as structural features of mind
looks for the primary impression that gives rise to causality
notes two relations that appear immediately involved in the concept of causation:
� the contiguity of causes and their effect in time and place
� the succession in time of effects upon their causes (since Hume thinks that causes must precede their effects)
these alone are insufficient for our concept of causation � many events are contiguous + successive without being causally connected
� necessary connection � far more important relation
= A must somehow produce or make B happen, such that B might not have happened without the occurrence of A
= some special tie between A and B which constitutes the causal link
= �efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion and productive quality�
what is necessary connection?
Hume approaches this circuitously, clarifying the nature of inference from impressions to ideas, belief, habit and the nature of probability
Hume�s main points so far:
impressions always precede ideas
possession of an idea is legitimate only if it can be traced to its originating impression
perceptions (impressions + ideas) are logically distinct, but associate together as a result of the three main kinds of relation (resemblance, contiguity and cuasation)
belief consists in the vivacity which a present impression attaches to an associated idea
new point:
to say that perceptions are logically distinct (�atomic�) is to say that none of them implies or is necessarily linked to others, so that the mere contemplation of any one would not lead the mind to associate it with another
but the mind does form associations, and moves from one to another frequently + easily
what explains this?
the constant conjunctions of ideas in our experience lead us to form habits of mind in relation to them
like grooves worn by repeated passage
it comes to seem as if there�s a necessary tie between them
this is the key to causation � the habitual transition of thought between perceptions feels like a necessitation or determination
this is the origin of the idea of necessary connection
two important points follow:
this explains why we believe in the existence of things not present in the mind
these reasonings are founded entirely on experience, not rational principles or innate ideas
one such habit of thought is pivotal in our causal reasonings � belief in the uniformity of nature
i.e. that the world will continue in future to be much as it has been in the past
in summary:
the tie of necessary connection �lies in ourselves, and is nothing but the detemrination of the mind, which is acquired by custom, and causes us to make a transition from an object to its usually attendant, and from the impression of one to the lively idea of the other�
necessary connection is not discovered in but projected onto the world (i.e. contributed by the way our midns are constituted)
this same kind of analysis applies to beliefs in the external world, in the existence of a self which is the bearer of personal identity over time, and in the principles of morals
Hume�s �science of human nature� based on �experimental method� is psychology not philosophy
but it�s armchair- + introspection-based psychology, rather than experimental psychology
Grayling argues that Locke + Hume�s poineering attempts to construct theories of psychology address issues beyond the remit of scientific psychology, e.g. knowledge, truth, identity, reason and probability
Hume wanted to extend Hutcheson�s argument that our moral + aesthetic valuations are based on sentiment not reason, by showing that all our beliefs are a product �more properly of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures�
his wider objective was to show that the �foundations of morals� lie in human nature and are not objectively discoverable by reason
he wanted thus to show that reason cannot explain causation, prove the existence of an external world or of persisting selves
at best: reason can only serve as �the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them� (Treatise, II iii 3)
he is not a sceptic about causation, the external world, or reason etc.
he is a sceptic about the claims of rationalism (that reason is the principal route to truth)
the distinction between impressions + ideas is important but unclear:
meant to mark the difference between experience and thought
they are distinguished by the degree of forcefulness (i.e. qualitatively the same) with which they appear in consciousness
Hume admits that impressions can be faint (e.g. when sleepy) and ideas vivid (e.g. when fevered)
can we just see (introspectively) the difference between experience and thought???
arguably, sense-experience cannot be regarded as possible in the absence of beliefs about the realm over which it ranges
i.e. perception is �theory-laden�
without certain beliefs + concepts, it would be just uninterpreted stimulation of the sensory pathways
difficult for Hume�s account to explain how his theory of human nature could incorporate the theory-ladenness of perception (i.e. impressions), or what contributions are made by mind to experience beyond just associating
perhaps impressions� arriving prior to ideas is another criterion for distinguishing them
i.e. temporal priority amounts to epistemological privilege
but it begs the question, because his empiricist method is to require ideas (concepts/beliefs) to be legitimised by the impressions (experiences) that gave rise to them
and some ideas entered the mind before other ideas, and yet they don't get epistemological privilege
temporal priority may be necessary but not sufficient then for serving as an empirical basis for justification
these problems about the criterion of idffce between impressions and ideas arise because Hume cannot assume belief in an external world
� xxx
??? pg 536
impressions �arise in the soul originally, from unknown causes� � ��twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived the author of our being�
Hume�s advance on Locke�s �invincible consciousness� that sensory perception is in order as a means to knowledge lies in Hume�s notion of a systematic account of the nature + functionings of mind which can reveal that certain fundamental commitments are structural to it (which Kant develops)
Hume�s account of belief (vs considering/disbelieving) conflicts with ordinary experience
e.g. reading fiction vs history (where the lively conceptions may be the opposite of the factually believable)
he was dissatisfied with it himself (Appendix to the Treatise)
he had no choice because his account of the mind was so bare, and only allowed for distinctions on the basis of degrees of force + liveliness
he is right that a belief has something that a mere idea lacks
just as he rejects the proposal that there could be an accompanying impression of �existence� to other impressions, so he rejects an accompanying impression of �truth�
he could have concluded that belief consists in:
a particular attitude towards an idea, e.g.:
readiness to act upon it
or to license certain inferences from it which it would not license otherwise
a combination of an idea andan appropriate emotion
but he chose to characterise belief in terms of a property of the idea:
degree of force + liveliness � borrowed from associated impressions
his account does allow the content of the idea to be separated from its epistemic status (whether it is believed/disbelieved/considered etc.)
although a theory of belief as a mental attitude also has this advantage
part of Hume�s problem could be that he�s trying to explain belief from the believer�s viewpoint (i.e. phenomenology)
�as opposed to an independent specification, drawing on dispositions to action, license to draw inferences etc.
causation is important because it�s the only relation that can take us beyond present experience to what lies in the world beyond
two definitions of cause:
1. as a �philosophical relation� a cause is �an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter�
2. as a �natural relation� a cause is �an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other�
critics argue that the two definitions are not equivalent and that the definition of relation is unclear
Hume thinks they present a different view of the same object
�philosophical relation� = �a comparison of ideas�
i.e. contiguity, temporal order and constant conjunction
�natural relation� = �an association betwixt ideas�
i.e. contiguity, temporal order and the association of our perceptions of the objects between which the �philosophical� relation holds
i.e. the accustomed link which invites thought + expecation to move from one to the other as if necessitated
(??? pg 538)
some critics are reluctant to prioritise definition (2) because it makes Hume�s account fundamentally psychologistic
what�s wrong with that??? surely Hume�s account is fundamentally psychologistic???
I think by psychologistic, Grayling is saying that it would be an ontological claim that causation exists only in the mind
�necessity� would become subjective necessity, and it leads to thinking that causal nexuses cease to hold in nature in the absence of observers
they argue that (2) is carelessly drafted, and (1) is better
�As to what may be said, that the operations of nature are independent of our thought and reasoning, I allow it; and have accordingly observed, that objects bear to each other the relations of contiguity and succession �. independent of and antecedent to our understanding�
this sounds pretty realist, but he then says:
�But if we go any farther, and ascribe a power of necessary connexion to these objects; this is what we can never observe in them, but must draw the idea of it from what we feel internally in contemplating them�
which supports (2)
two parallel definitions of necessity:
1. �the constant union and conjunction of like objects�
2. �in the inference of the mind from the one to the other�
necessity(1) threatens regression, since like causation(1), it is defined in terms of regularity (??? pg 539)
further objections:
it has been argued that Hume�s view is itself a causal theory
we are caused to believe in causality by experiential regularities giving rise in us to habits of mind � circularity
could deny that it is viciously circular
Grayling says: �for supose we are indeed caused to believe in causality; surely this fact does the reverse of making the acction we are caused to give of it false. It is, instead, the very evidence we have for asserting it� (??? pg 539)
no way of distinguishing between a connection�s being causal and its being completely coincidental but unfailing constant conjunction
e.g. the sun rises every morning and I blink an eyelid
so why don't we forge the projective link of necessity between them
can you use negative evidence, e.g. about the multiplicity of conditions under which we blink our eyelids???
self = persists through time + change (intuitive definition)
the substrate or support of our thinking, perceiving, memory etc. � �bearers� of our psychological properties
Hume:
the concept of the self has no empirical basis
on introspection, we find �nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions� in a state of continual change
no single persisting thing over + above particular occurrent perceptions can be discerned among them
we are mistaken if we �suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives�
we have confused the notions of �identity� and �diversity�
identity = the idea of something persisting through time ninterrruptedly and changelessly
diversity = a succession of related objects
the confusion arises because the experience of diversity is the experience of related objects succeeding each other, which feels to the mind like an experience of a single, persisting, unchanging thing
so we project identity onto a succession
thus, an individual is an impermanent bundle of occurrent impressions + ideas
but how then is the bundle/individual bundled together/individuated?
Hume says the bundle is kept together by resemblance, contiguity + causation
but are these sufficient for individuation?
if not, we have lost the principle of identity and the principle of individuation
his account rests on the charge that it is a mistake to call something that change the �same thing�
is this is a mistake?
there are different ways of counting entities, e.g.
an individual man counts as one
so does a rugby team of fifteen men
thirty men constitute the �set of players in a rugby match�
etc.
anything consisting of parts is both many things and one thing � if you change those parts, it may still be the same thing
e.g. substituting a rugby player, or replacing cells in the body
thus identity can be preserved over time, even if all of the parts are eventually replaced
arugably then, even though a self is not any one of its component perceptions, why can't you count the bundle of perceptions as one, even though those component perceptions change
then Grayling says: if the idea of a history of a bundle�s changes makes sense, as this further implies it does, then it usggests another line of resistance to Hume�s argument, namely that something needs to be postulated as the subject of those changes, without appeal to which the very idea of change itself might fail to make sense
naturalism (e.g. Quine) = philosophers
should premise the deliverance so the natural sciences in their work
naturalism (e.g. Hume) = many of our beliefs are not derived from/established by reason, but are a function of human nature � we�re just made that way
e.g. the existence of body (i.e. the external world), personal identity, causation (and therefore the reliability of inductive inference, which rests wholly on the relation of cause + effect)
this is what woke Kant from his �dogmatic slumbers� � facts about the constitution of our minds (which Kant tried to describe systematically) play a central role in giving us the beliefs + experiences that we enjoy
distinction between:
matters of fact = discovered by observation and causal inference, i.e. how things are in the world
relations of ideas = discovered either by:
intuition = e.g. that �1 + 1 = 2�
demonstration = e.g. proves a theorem or deductively infers a conclusion from its premises
corresponds to the modern necessary/contingent distinction:
necessary = denying a true necessary proposition is to contradict oneself
contingent = whereas to deny a true contingent proposition is merely to say something false, not contradictory, because it might have been true in other circumstances
he ends the Enquiry attacking rationalism/scholasticism:
�When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principoles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphyics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion�
this prompted the accusations of scepticism, and that he had produced a reductio of the empiricist project
Grayling says that actually, it shows Hume to be not a sceptic but a �naturalist� � his scepticism is reserved for rationalist claims to offer a priori proofs of our most fundamental concepts
Grayling mentions further topics not fully covered here:
accounts of abstract ideas, substance, space + time, and probability
there�s no such thing as an empiricist thesis � there�s only two kinds of rationalism - one that thinks the method by which it validates itself is enough to provide new (other) knowledge as well, while the other thinks that the rationalist method is good only for validating another method that can then provide knowledge � but is the empirical method itself underpinned by reason � �the Candle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our Purposes� (Locke)� neither pure rationalism nor empiricism are plausible/stand up
is the reason that experience focuses on the five senses, at the expenses of vestibular, pain etc. that the five are less relational, and tell you more about the external world as opposed to how the external world impinges upon our bodies???
how is logical/psychological priority different from independence/antecedence of knowledge (pg 491)???
ideas vs concepts???
veil of perception vs representative theory of perception???
did Berkeley and Locke live at the same time??? did Locke read Berkeley�s criticisms???
individual essences + substance???
when Hume disbands the self, isn't that somehow different from personal identity (especially in the forensic sense Locke intended)???
how does perception fit in with ideas/notions???
how do you know that the �some other spirit that produces [most of our ideas]� is good/omnipotent, the same spirit each time etc.???
would it be possible to secularise Berkeley (e.g. his talk of God as the Author of Nature, and Laws of Nature as effectively patterns)???
why shouldn't you �begin inquiry among the private data of individual consciousness, i.e. among the ideas constituting an individual�s experience�??? where else could you begin???
�Grayling thinks that if you defer discussion of God, and allow his Cartesian starting-point, Berkeley�s views are resilient� � seems very similar to Descartes � how similar are Berkeley�s and Descartes�s views of the world???
how does Hume cope with Berkeley�s rejection of the mind as just a bundle of ideas (�a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour � therefore I am one individual principle, distinct from � all sensible things and inert ideas�)???
�follows from the attack on abstraction, i.e. that we cannot abstract ideas from perception of them� � what�s this aboutz/why's it important???
Berkeley still won't have proved a Christian God, so much as just a (Hegelian???) universe
why couldn't the admittedly regular �continual succession� of sensory ideas that don't originate in our minds be produced by a number of other (different type of) minds??? � why an infinite, God-like mind???
could Hume not argue, about the missing blue, that colour is a single (or three, say) simple perception(s), from which all the colours are derived as complex ideas???
Nozick seems to have drawn heavily on Hume�s idea of Custom, adding in a biological/evolutionary explanation for the origin of self-evidence
�I wonder why he didn't consider causation as being one of the pre-rational self-evidences, along with the external world, other minds etc.
doesn't Hume�s force + liveliness account of belief paradoxically mean that we could believe an idea that is forceful and lively, but which we disbelieve because we cannot trace its originating impression???
philosophical vs natural relation of causation???
what, in summary, is Hume�s causation argument???
what�s the difference between the principles of identity + individuation???